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The Phenomenology of REM-Sleep Dreaming: The Contributions of
Personal and Perspectival Ownership, Subjective Temporality, and
Episodic Memory
Stan B. Klein
University of California, Santa Barbara
Although the dream narrative, of (bio)logical necessity, originates with the dreamer, he
or she typically is not aware of this. For the dreamer, the dream world is the real world.
In this article, I argue that this nightly misattribution is best explained in terms of the
concept of mental ownership (e.g., Albahari, 2006; Klein, 2015a; Lane, 2012). Spe-
cifically, the exogenous nature of the dream narrative is the result of an individual
assuming perspectival, but not personal, ownership of the content she or he authored
(i.e., “The content in my head is not mine. Therefore it must be peripherally per-
ceived”). Situating explanation within a theoretical space designed to address questions
pertaining to the experienced origins of conscious content has a number of salutary
consequences. For example, it promotes predictive fecundity by bringing to light
empirical generalizations whose presence otherwise might have gone unnoticed (e.g.,
the severely limited role of mental time travel within the dream narrative).
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During the first years of the new millennium,
I examined a patient with a very unusual im-
pairment of memory. Despite suffering severe
head injury, R. B. was able to recall events from
his past that were rich in detail and indepen-
dently verifiable (Klein & Nichols, 2012). How-
ever, although he maintained perspectival own-
ership of retrieved content—that is, he knew it
was “in my head”—he did not feel it personally
owned. That is, he did not experience the con-
tent as “my memory.” (The difference between
personal and perspectival ownership is critically
important in what follows. It is also subtle and
thus liable to misunderstanding and confusion.
Table 1 is included in the hope of making the
distinction clear.)
For instance, asked to remember a time spent
with friends, R. B. produced a thorough account
of a social event from his college years. But, he
lamented.
My memories [R. B.’s emphasis] do not feel in any
way like they’re my memories. They feel like facts I
know, like that Washington was the first president. I
can infer that they’re about me because I know what
they’re about. . . . It doesn’t take much (inference). But
even then, when I figure out a memory is about me it
doesn’t help me take ownership. It feels like third party
. . . like it belongs to some else. (Klein, 2016a, p. 492;
parenthetical remark added for clarity)
The tension between elements of R. B.’s sub-
jectivity (i.e., despite knowing that he must be
the author—after all, the content was in his
head—he was unable to take possessory cus-
tody of that content) suggested a potentially
important insight into the workings of the mind.
What I had was a collection of facts document-
ing R. B.’s paradoxical phenomenology. What I
needed was a way to transition from fact to
explanation. This meant aligning those facts
with a theoretical framework capable of fitting
them together in a logically defensible way
(e.g., Margenau, 1950; Nagel, 1961; Trusted,
1979).
I thank Carl Craver, Chris McFerron, and Jude Bijou for
their help and encouragement. I particularly want to ac-
knowledge Steve Lynn for his excellent advice and gener-
ous support.
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Table 1
Notes on Personal and Perspectival Ownership
By personal ownership, I mean that the content presented to consciousness is experienced as originating exclusively
within the person (i.e., it is “mine”). It is felt as part of one’s sense of self (e.g., Klein, 2014a). In contrast, content
delivered to consciousness via the senses is treated as external to the self (i.e., other). Such content has perspectival but
not personal ownership.
1. Personal Ownership
Appropriation of content to the self is noninferential and prereflective. It is directly given to consciousness as “mine”
(e.g., Klein, 2014a, 2015a; Lane, 2012; Zahavi, 2005, 2011). In James’s (1890) colorful terms, personal ownership
entails the feeling that one’s subjective experiences are imbued with a sense of warmth and intimacy.
Personal ownership is related to, but not identical with, personal retrieval. Though they typically co-occur, on very
rare occasions a person can believe that s/he retrieved content, yet still feel the content is not personally owned.
Consider the case of patient R.B. Although R. B. believed he was responsible for bringing Content X into
consciousness (as thought, image, etc.), he did not feel that X originated in his personal past. Absent a sense of
personal ownership, R. B. treated the content in consciousness “other;” that is, he took it to be a first-person
apprehension of external reality (i.e., “The memories I retrieved are not my memories;” for discussion, see Klein,
2014a, 2016a; Klein & Nichols, 2012; Zahavi, 2011).
Given the automatic and flawless manner in which the relation between the content and personal ownership typically
unfolds, we usually are unaware that there is a relation being forged. However, in certain clinical conditions the
content presented to consciousness, despite its endogenous origins, lacks a sense of being personally owned. Under
these (very unusual) circumstances, the normally invisible relation between content and personal ownership is
made apparent by its absence. The afflicted individual may discover (e.g., via inference) that she or he authored
the content, but this knowledge does not confer a directly given sense of personal ownership (e.g., Klein, 2013a,
2015a, 2015b, 2016a). Absent the ability to take possessory custody of content normally associated with self (e.g.,
my thoughts, my bodily appendages), subjective awareness is accompanied by a bewildering feeling of
disconnectedness—i.e., what should be “self” is experienced as “non-self” (i.e., as other; e.g., Earle, 1972; Klein,
2014a; Klein & Nichols, 2012; Lane, 2012; Zahavi, 2005).
2. Perspectival Ownership
Perspectival ownership is the experience that content in consciousness exists exclusively in “me” (specifically, “in
my head”). It consists in the feeling that my conscious content appears in a manner different from that in which
conscious content appears to anyone else. Unlike personal ownership, perspectival ownership can be associated
with endogenously generated or externally perceived content.
While all personally owned content is, of logical necessity, also perspectivally owned, perspectival ownership does
not guarantee that an intentional object will be felt as personally owned (Patient R. B. is a case in point). Readers
may find this hard to accept. The relation between personally retrieved conscious content and personal ownership
is a default mode (e.g., Klein, 2015a; Lane, 2012). To appreciate the experience of perspectival ownership in the
absence of personal ownership requires we actually undergo that experience (e.g., Nagel, 1974). I hope the reader
will never be in that position.
3. The Contingent Nature of Personal and Perspectival Ownership
The connection between content in consciousness and types of ownership is not intrinsic (X is an intrinsic property
of Y if Y’s having the Property X does not consist in Y also having a relation, Z, to something else). Rather it is
one of contingency (i.e., it is annexed to, rather than a basic constituent, of the intentional object; Klein, 2013a,
2014a, 2014c, 2014d, 2015a; Lane, 2012). Patient R. B., for example, lost and subsequently regained personal
ownership of the content retrieved into consciousness (e.g., Klein & Nichols, 2012).
When the sense of personal or perspectival ownership is rendered dysfunctional by a clinical disorder (e.g.,
somatoparaphrenia, depersonalization, pain asymbolia), the mechanisms that enable a person to take noninferential
possessory custody of content that, of ontological necessity, is authored by the person, no longer operate (though
s/he does not know it). Under these circumstances, the consciousness content is treated as external in origin.
On occasion, a person suffering from a clinically mediated loss of personal ownership may transition from a directly
given feeling to a sense of personal ownership based on logical inference (e.g., because X is in my head, it must
be mine). However, although inference enables the patient to take custody of content in consciousness, the shift
from “pre-reflective given” to “product of inference” imbues this acquired (i.e., nonautomatic) ownership with a
upsetting feeling of experiential detachment (that is, “While I can infer X must be mine, it does not feel personally
owned; e.g., Albahari, 2006; Klein, 2015a; Lane, 2012; Zahavi, 2005, 2011; Zahn, Talazko, & Ebert, 2008).
4. Ownership, Self and Other
Personal ownership is the mental wedge that enables us to distinguish self from non-self (Klein, 2014a). What makes
consciousness content “mine” is that I intuitively sense—without need for intuition, inference, or reflection—the
content as originating within “me.” Absent this, content is experienced as issuing from a reality that exists
independently of the self (for discussions, see Albahari, 2006; Klein, 2013a, 2015a; Lane, 2012; Zahavi, 2011).
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Seeking direction, I conducted a search of the
literature on “memory” and “loss of personal
ownership.” Unfortunately, little light was shed
on R. B.’s discordant phenomenology. The only
case bearing a resemblance was reported by
Talland (1964). However, the paucity of detail
he provided made any attempt at drawing par-
allels between cases ill-advised. Unable to find
empirical or conceptual guidance, I set aside
R. B.’s files and turned my attention to less
perplexing issues.
But the mystery of R. B.’s anomalous sub-
jectivity continued to haunt me. After a hiatus
of nearly half a dozen years, I returned to the
literature. This time, however, I broadened my
search to include any neurocognitive pathology
(not just one of memory) whose symptoms in-
cluded an inability to take noninferential pos-
sessory custody of one’s intentional objects.
(I sometimes refer to “content in consciousness”
as “intentional objects.” Intentionality, in the
literature on philosophy of mind, refers to the
proposition that every consciousness state is
about or directed at some object. Intentional
object is the name given to content accorded
conscious consideration; Brentano, 1995; Tex-
tor, 2013; Thomassoin, 2000).
Casting a larger net proved propitious, bring-
ing in tow an assortment of (mostly esoteric)
neurocognitive pathologies (e.g., anosagnosia,
somatoparaphrenia, depersonalization, pain
asymbolia) in which loss of personal ownership
was a symptom (e.g., disavowing possession of
one’s bodily appendages, thought insertion, hal-
lucinations; for reviews see Klein, 2015a; Lane,
2012; Stephens & Graham, 2000). R. B.’s sub-
jective disharmony could now be situated in a
well-developed conceptual framework capable
of introducing order and coherence to what ap-
peared to be irreconcilable elements of his phe-
nomenology (while beyond the scope of this
paper, an account of the mental machinery re-
sponsible for R. B.’s fractured phenomenology
can be found in Klein, 2015a). Fact had given
way to explanation.
The Normalcy of Personal Ownership and
Its Loss
What I had taken to be a unique pathology of
subjectivity thus proved more common than
suspected: Examples could be found—provided
loss of personal ownership was not limited to
afflictions of memory. In another sense, how-
ever, the phenomenon remained elusive: When
manifest, it appeared only as a symptom asso-
ciated with a few comparatively uncommon
neurocognitive disorders.
In this paper, I argue that loss of personal
ownership of one’s intentional objects is more
than a symptomatic curiosity attending certain
clinical conditions. Rather, it is an accompani-
ment of a perfectly normal nightly occur-
rence—the rapid-eye movement (REM)-sleep
dream. Although a dream narrative is, of bio-
logical necessity, authored by the dreamer, he or
she does not know this (unless the dream is
lucid; e.g.,Voss, Schermelleh-Engel, Windt,
Frenzl, & Hobson, 2013). For the dreamer, the
dream world is the real world (e.g., Foulkes,
1985; Hobson, 2009; McNamara, McLaren, &
Durso, 2007; Soper, Rosenthal, & Milford,
1994; Tranquillo, 2014; Zadra & Domhoff,
2016; Zippel, 2016). Considered from the per-
spective of mental ownership, dream phenom-
enology is a naturally recurring, nonpatho-
logical state in which an individual maintains
perspectival, but not personal, ownership of
content she or he authored (this also occurs
during nonrapid-eye movement [NREM]-
sleep dreaming—e.g., Cavallero, Foulkes,
Hollifield, & Terry, 1990; MacDuffie &
Mashour, 2010; Wamsley, 2013. However, in
this article I restrict discussion to dreams
occurring during REM sleep).
Contemporary Explanations for the
Misattribution of the Origins of
Dream Content
The schism between the endogenous origins
of dream content and its treatment as a series of
perceptually given, often surreal, exogenous
events has been recognized since antiquity (e.g.,
Foulkes, 1985). Most contemporary psycholog-
ical accounts of dream-source misattribution
explain the phenomenon in terms of degrada-
tion in the function of some psychological fac-
ulty (e.g., reasoning, remembering, self, con-
sciousness).
Recounting all the explanations offered for
dream-source misidentification would be pro-
hibitive, but those currently receiving serious
attention include (a) reduced capacity to evalu-
ate, monitor, and reflect on content in con-
sciousness (e.g., Darling, Hoffmann, Moffitt, &
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Purcell, 1993; Hobson, 2009; Nir & Tononi,
2010); (b) limited availability of memories that
would provide a context within which to eval-
uate the bizarre content of the dream (e.g., Hob-
son & Friston, 2012; Foulkes, 1985; MacDuffie
& Mashour, 2010; McNamara et al., 2007;
Tranquillo, 2014); (c) impairment of mecha-
nisms that would allow the dreamer to identify
the hallucinatory quality of dream content (e.g.,
Hobson, 1999; Occhionero, Cicogna, Natale,
Esposito, & Bosinelli, 2005; Tranquillo, 2014;
Zippel, 2016); (d) diminished capacity of the
dreamer to engage in logical reasoning (e.g.,
Maquet et al., 2005); (e) regression to a rudi-
mentary form of consciousness (i.e., protocon-
sciousness) that cannot support reflective
thought (e.g., Hobson, 2009; Hobson, Pace-
Schott, & Stickgold, 2000; Solms, 2013); and
(f) restricted access to “mental activeness,” a
psychological trait that enables the dreamer to
diagnose the compromised character of his or
her phenomenology (e.g., O’Shaughnessy,
2000).
Scientific Theory and Scientific Explanation
in Broad Brush Strokes
There are two outstanding characteristics of any scien-
tific theory. First, the theory explains observed regu-
larities by relating them to new entities which it educes
as existent facts. Second it must be possible to deduce
generalizations from the propositions of the theory
which can be used to predict new observable facts.
(Trusted, 1979, p. 73; emphasis in original)
Science can be viewed as the systematic ex-
ploration of relations between abstract theory
and empirical evidence (e.g., Hempel, 1965;
Klee, 1997; Margenau, 1950; Nagel, 1961;
Trusted, 1979). Theory consists in a hypotheti-
cal space occupied by constructs (i.e., explana-
tory variables not directly observable) and their
interrelations. The empirical side consists in
directly or indirectly observable data. The two
are connected by rules that enable the formula-
tion of generalizations to explain associations
between abstract constructs and observable data
(e.g., Klee, 1997; Klein, 2014b; Ladyman,
2002; Margenau, 1950; Trusted, 1979). To dis-
courage the proliferation of ad hoc explana-
tions, a scientific theory requires that these as-
sociations be supported by logical entailments
between construct and empirical regularity. Be-
cause ad hoc explanations are explicitly tailored
to a specific problem, such accounts lack gen-
eralizability. Accordingly, the explanatory
scope of an ad hoc account is restricted to the
particular empirical regularity it was crafted to
explain (e.g., Klein, 2014b, 2015b; Nagel,
1961; Trusted, 1979).
A theoretical structure consisting in abstract
constructs linked to empirical regularities often
goes by the name “nomological network” (e.g.,
Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Margenau, 1950;
Torgerson, 1958). A nomological network is a
theoretical space joining physical observations
with a well-formulated and rationally integrated
set of abstract constructs. Situating explanation
within a nomological network not only en-
hances the epistemic warrant of our hypotheses,
it also alerts us to relations between data and
construct that might otherwise have gone unde-
tected. It does by disclosing theory-driven im-
plications different from those to which the
explanation was originally fitted. This predic-
tive ability is a critically important aspect of
scientific theory and explanation (e.g., Klein,
2014b; Margenau, 1950; Newell, 1973; Trusted,
1979).
Problems With Current Psychological
Explanations of Dream Ontology
Virtually all contemporary explanations of
dream-source misattribution are riffs on a com-
mon theme: “Degradation of psychological fac-
ulty X” results in “failure to recognize the ori-
gins of dream content.” Although it is presently
impossible to empirically verify these proposals
(rules wedding cause to effect are not currently
available), this, in itself, is not cause for dismay:
It simply underscores the nature of scientific
explanation—that is, the need for further exper-
imentation to clarify the relation between con-
struct and data (e.g., Bartlett, 1932).
What is troubling is that these proposals are
mostly grounded in ad hoc reasoning. Accord-
ingly, variables recruited to explain dream-
source confusion (e.g., reflection, reasoning, re-
membering, evaluation) have few, if any,
theoretically mandated causal connections with
the phenomenon they are intended to explain.
This, in turn, raises serious questions about their
inferential warrant. Why, for instance, does
degradation in the performance of Variable X
(e.g., content evaluation) result in source miss-
assignment as opposed to, say, a decrement in
the clarity (imagistic, semantic, etc.) of content?
4 KLEIN
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Why does an unspecified amount of degradation
in evaluative resources result in the complete
failure to (correctly) experience dream content
as endogenous in origin? How much judgmen-
tal degradation, or memory fragmentation, is
required for the categorical shift from endoge-
nous to exogenous source attribution found in
the dream state? Lacking the requisite logical
entailments, the case for specific cause–effect
relations is more a matter of stipulation than
principled deduction.
Another problem with these proposals is that
their causal modus operandi—that is, source
misattribution—is a consequence of impairment
in the ability to evaluate dream-content origins.
However, it is well-known that the manner in
which content in consciousness assumes its
phenomenological character (including its ori-
gins) is direct and prereflective: No evaluation,
reflection, inference or other mental gymnastics
are required (e.g., Albahari, 2006; Klein, 2014a;
Klein, 2015a; Lane, 2012; Zahavi, 2005, 2011).
Hence, judgment and evaluation play no part in
ascertaining the source of an intentional object.1
In sum, the degradation theories of dream
ontology are both conceptually and phenome-
nologically ill-suited to the job for which they
were fashioned. Moreover, because these expla-
nations are largely ad hoc, their explanatory
reach is restricted to the particular phenomena
they were designed to elucidate: Degradation
accounts are likely to lead to epistemic dead
ends.
The Personal and Perspectival Ownership
Explanation of Dream Ontology
The problems attending degradation accounts
of source attribution can be circumvented when
explanation is located within a theoretical space
specifically designed to address questions about
the origin of content present in consciousness
(e.g., Albahari, 2006; Klein, 2014a, 2015a;
Lane, 2012; Stephens & Graham, 2000; Zahavi,
2005). According to such accounts, misidenti-
fication of the source of the dream narrative is
the direct consequence of the dreamer assuming
perspectival ownership of the content he or she
authored, but failing to take possessory custody.
In consequence, the intentional object is treated
as an external happening presenting to one’s
senses (see Table 1).2
Positioning explanation within a nomological
network allows one to trace the logical entail-
ments among constructs in the same network.
This, in turn, fosters predictive fecundity: Dis-
covering how constructs that figured in the ini-
tial explanatory effort are related to previously
unexamined constructs occupying the same
space promotes discovery of new empirical
generalizations (e.g., Klein, 2014b; Newell,
1973; Torgerson, 1958; Trusted, 1979).
Ownership as the Basis for Generating
Testable Predictions About the Role of
Mental Time Travel in REM-Sleep
Dreams: Logical Entailments
The construct of Personal Ownership shares
theoretical space with constructs that, on first
view, appear to have no obvious relevance to
questions pertaining to dream-source phenome-
nology. However, a careful examination of the
interrelations between constructs offers insight
into dream phenomenology that go well beyond
the question of source identification. In what fol-
lows, I show how an analysis of the relation be-
tween Personal Ownership and Subjective Tem-
porality can facilitate detection of new
generalizations about the way in which we expe-
rience the dream narrative.
The form of Subjective Temporality directly
relevant to present concerns is called mental
time travel (for reviews see Klein, 2013a; Mi-
chaelian, 2016; Tulving, 2002; Suddendorf &
Corballis, 1997, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). Mental
time travel refers to the possibility that a first-
person perspective can be subjectively located
1 An exception to this “process blindness” occurs when
the mechanisms that enable Personal Ownership are com-
promised by clinical disorders (e.g., depersonalization, so-
matoparaphrenia). Under these circumstances, the process
that endows conscious content with a feeling of Personal
Ownership is made conspicuous by its absence. Although
some patients may attempt to make sense of their subjective
dissonance (e.g., “The thoughts are in my head but are not
mine”) via inference (e.g., “Perhaps God is talking to me”),
their explanations are accompanied by unsettling feelings of
detachment (e.g., Albahari, 2006; Klein, 2012). In contrast,
an analysis of content source is seldom, if ever, undertaken
by the dreamer when dreaming (the exception being a
person experiencing a lucid dream).
2 The question of why the mechanisms enabling Personal
Ownership are inactive during dreaming remains open.
However, this explanatory gap in our understanding (i.e.,
the why question) is a constant among explanations cur-
rently in play.
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at time periods other than the present. It mani-
fests when a person (a) remembers a past hap-
pening as if she or he were experiencing it
again, or (b) imagines him or herself in a future-
oriented scenario.
Drawing on the work of early 20th-century
phenomenologists, Tulving (1985) proposed
that the experience of mental time travel is a
construct enabled by a mode of consciousness
called Autonoesis: Autonoetic Consciousness
“. . . mediates an individual’s awareness of his
or her existence and identity in subjective time
extending from the personal past through the
present to the personal future” (Tulving, 1985,
p. 1). A person who possesses Autonoetic Con-
sciousness “is capable of becoming aware of his
or her own past as well as future; she or he is
capable of mental time travel, roaming at will
over what has happened as readily as over what
might happen, independently of physical laws
that govern the universe” (Tulving, 1985, p. 5).
The constructs of Personal Ownership and
Autonoesis share an interesting, asymmetric,
relation.
1. Autonoesis entails a sense of Personal
Ownership (Autonoesis is Greek for self-
knowing) because our capacity to subjec-
tively experience ourselves at times other
than the present requires that the remem-
bered event or imagined scenario be “my”
event or scenario (e.g., Klein, 2013b,
2016b; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002;
Klein & Steindam, 2016).
2. Absent Personal Ownership, a remem-
bered event or imagined scenario would
not be consciously regarded as “some-
thing that happened, or that might happen,
to me” (i.e., it would not entail Autonoetic
Consciousness). While I might, via infer-
ential effort, situate the intentional object
chronologically (e.g., I know that Hendrix
died when I was in 12th grade. That would
be 1970), this would not be accompanied
by a sense of reexperiencing the event in
which that knowledge was acquired (e.g.,
Klein, 2013b, 2014a; Klein et al., 2002).
3. Personal Ownership does not require Auto-
noetic Consciousness. I can take possessory
custody of an intentional object without hav-
ing to locate that object temporally. For ex-
ample, knowing that my name is Stan can be
experienced as my knowledge, unaccompa-
nied by any sense of temporal placement
(beyond that of present experience; e.g.,
Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2011; Klein,
2016b: Klein & Steindam, 2016c).
Ownership as the Basis for Generating
Testable Predictions About the Role of
Mental Time Travel in REM-Sleep
Dreams: Empirical Generalizations
If misattribution of the origins of dream con-
tent is a result of loss of Personal Ownership, it
follows that during a dream, the dreamer is
denied access to Autonoetic Consciousness and
therefore the ability to engage in mental time
travel (see Point 2, above). He or she can know
about, and respond to, current dream contingen-
cies, but lacks the ability to survey the temporal
landscape via acts of (a) reliving events that
took place previously within the dream or (b)
projecting him or herself into yet-to-be realized
dream enactments.3 The dreamer is experien-
tially tethered to the forward-moving “now” of
the dream narrative.4,5
Although questions concerning subjective
temporality are of interest to dream theorists
(e.g., Crowther & Soteriou, 2017; Grenier et al.,
3 This is not to say the dreamer lacks appreciation of
things nonpresent. For example, anticipation, expectation,
and goals all can exist in the moment (see Footnote 4). What
it does mean is that the ability to mentally project oneself
into the past or future is denied to the dreamer?
4 My use of the word the “now” is decidedly future-
oriented. Analysis of the formal properties of the “present of
objective time” reveals it to be instantaneous (e.g., Faye,
1989; McLure, 2005), becoming the next “present” essen-
tially as soon as it makes an appearance (e.g., Husserl, 1964;
James, 1890; Klein, 2013c). The present is a process con-
sisting in an endless series of “nows” transitioning instan-
taneously to the “next” (as well as retreating into the past;
e.g., Husserl, 1964). Thus, the subjective present necessarily
is oriented toward and phenomenologically indistinguish-
able from what will be present (or, to a lesser degree, what
has just been past). Even the well-worn idea of a “specious
present” (e.g., Husserl, 1964; James, 1890) requires inclu-
sion of protention—i.e., orientation toward the “next”—as
an essential constituent of the present. In short, the moment
of the present is, formally speaking, an abstract point in a
temporal continuum constantly moving toward the “next”
and away from the “previous.”
5 Although I am not the first to propose that the dreamer’s
temporal experience is restricted to the present (e.g., Hob-
son, 1999; O’Shaughnessy, 2000), I am, to the best of my
knowledge, the first to deduce this experiential myopia from
examination of the logical entailments between constructs
occupying a common theoretical space.
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2005; Hobson, 1999; MacDuffie & Nashour,
2010), inquiries have focused primarily on com-
paring and contrasting temporality experienced
while dreaming with temporal experience while
awake. Examining the dreamer’s capacity to
wander the within-dream temporal landscape
has, to my knowledge, not been afforded em-
pirical consideration.
However, an approximation of the role of men-
tal time travel in dream phenomenology can be
procured from an investigation of the role of epi-
sodic memory in the dream narrative (e.g., Cav-
allero et al., 1990; Fosse, Fosse, Hobson, & Stick-
gold, 2003; Malinowski & Horton, 2014;
Schwartz, 2003). This is because the temporal
commitments of mental time travel are isomor-
phic with those of episodic memory (e.g., Klein,
2013a, 2013b, 2014c, 2016b: Markowitsch, 2003;
Michaelian, 2016; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997,
2007; Szpunar, 2010; Tulving, 1985, 1993, 2002,
2005; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; for dis-
cussion, see Table 2). Accordingly, an examina-
tion of episodic memory in the dream narrative
can provide insight into the dreamer’s ability to
reexperience and preexperience aspects of the
dream narrative.
Unfortunately, with one exception, examina-
tions of the role of memory in dream phenom-
Table 2
The Evolution of Episodic Memory Criteria: A Synopsis
Episodic versus semantic memory
As initially conceptualized, episodic memory provided its owner with a record of the temporal, spatial and self-
referential features of the context in which remembered content was acquired (e.g., Tulving, 1972, 1983). In contrast,
semantic memory was held to lack these contextual features: Its offerings are experienced as content devoid of
knowledge concerning the circumstances in which it was attained.
Unfortunately, it subsequently was found that the core constituents of episodic memory (temporal, spatial and self-
referential) can also be on display during semantic memory experience (for reviews see Klein, 2013a; Kopelman,
Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989). Indeed, there are no principled reasons why the contextual features of these two systems
should differ (for discussion, see Klein, 2013a, 2015b, 2017).
For instance, the assumption that episodic, rather than semantic, memory entails a self-referential component has given
way to the well-recognized fact that knowledge in semantic memory also can be self-referential (for reviews, see
Klein, 2010; Klein & Lax, 2010; Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012). In addition, the content
of semantic memory is capable of representing both spatial and temporal contextual information (e.g., “I know that
John Lennon was born on October ninth, 1940 in Liverpool, UK, although I do not recollect the event in which that
knowledge was acquired;” Klein, 2001; Kopelman et al., 1989; Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovitch, 1988;
for reviews, see Klein, 2004; Klein, 2010; Klein & Lax, 2010; Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013).
In short, a steady stream of untidy findings slowly chipped away at the traditional classification of episodic memory in
terms of the criteria of time, space and self. Recognizing this, Tulving (1985) abandoned these criteria in favor of a
distinction based on the different relations episodic and semantic memory had with subjective time. Episodic memory
entails awareness that a current recollection refers directly to, and thus is experienced as, an event that transpired
previously in one’s life. In addition, episodic makes possible our ability to imagine ourselves in future-oriented
scenarios (for recent reviews, see Klein, 2013a; Michaelian, Klein, & Szpunar, 2016; Szpunar, 2010).
By contrast, the experience of content from semantic memory is occurrent—it is present to consciousness “now”, either
as thought or image. Though one can logically infer temporal facts about semantic memory (e.g., I know Jimi
Hendrix played in New Haven. Because Hendrix died in 1970, the concert must have occurred around 1968; for
discussion, see Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Klein & Steindam, 2016) feelings of personally re- or pre-living
are not part of its experienced presentation.
The distinction between episodic and semantic memory is now recognized to involve differences in the subjective
relations these systems have with the past and future. Episodic memory (a) enables one to re-experience events that
transpired previously in his or her life, and (b) provides the evidential scaffolding on which future-oriented personal
projection is crafted in imagination. Semantic memory experience, in contrast, is presented to consciousness only as
occurrent. Adopting terminology proposed originally by Husserl (1964), Tulving labeled the types of temporal
subjectivity accompanying the retrieval of episodic and semantic memory “autonoetic” and “noetic,” respectively
(e.g., Klein, 2014b; Tulving, 1985, 1993, 2002; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Szpunar & Tulving, 2011).
Tulving’s reformulation of episodic memory in terms of temporal subjectivity has been widely adopted by memory
researchers and has been shown to be a particularly fruitful way of generating testable hypotheses and evaluating
models of memory (e.g., Perner & Ruffman, 1994; Gardiner, 2001; Wheeler, 2005; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011;
for reviews, see Michaelian et al., 2016; Wheeler et al., 1997). Unfortunately, with one exception (discussed below),
dream researchers continue to use the outmoded, overly inclusive original criteria of time, space and self when
examining the contributions of episodic memory to the dream phenomenology.
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enology (e.g., Baylor & Cavallero, 2001; Cav-
allero et al., 1990; Fosse et al., 2003; Schwartz,
2003) have relied on an outdated, overly inclu-
sive definition of the episodic memory (see Ta-
ble 2). To date, the most comprehensive study
of the role of episodic memory in dreaming
found that less than 2% of 299 dream reports
contained evidence of episodic recollection
(Fosse et al., 2003). Thus, despite the adoption
of overly liberal evidential criteria (i.e., one
likely to include semantic as well as episodic
memory; see Table 2), Fosse et al. (2003) found
virtually no evidence that episodic memory fea-
tures in dream phenomenology.
Fortunately, a recent study by Malinowski
and Horton (2014) employed criteria that con-
formed closely to the current conceptualization
of episodic memory (i.e., recollection character-
ized by Autonoetic Consciousness). Using the
theoretically sanctioned definition, they found
that one out of 186 (0.5%) dream reports
showed any evidence6 of mental time travel
(with episodic memory serving as the diagnos-
tic proxy).
In sum, regardless of whether the empirical
indices of episodic memory are too liberal, or
are properly attuned to current theory (see Table
2), the role of mental time travel in dream
phenomenology has been found to be essen-
tially nonexistent (see Footnote 6). Consistent
with predictions, the dreamer appears securely
embedded within the forward-moving present
moment of the dream narrative.
Conclusion
Wittgenstein (1997) astutely observed that
we do not always need to look for explanations
hiding beneath the surface, hidden from view.
Often “the answer lies open to view and be-
comes surveyable by a rearrangement” (p. 92).
This is a particularly apt portrayal of our
exploration into the cause of the discordant as-
pects of dream phenomenology. The best fitting
explanation was the one grounded in a well-
developed theory specifically tailored to ques-
tions of personal and perspectival ownership.
Our inability to see an explanation “hiding in
plain sight” was largely a consequence of the
automatic and flawless manner in which the
process of taking ownership of conscious con-
tent normally transpires: People tend not to con-
sider, much less theorize about, processes
whose existence they do not suspect. However,
once it is appreciated that ownership of con-
scious content is a matter of contingency rather
than necessity, its relevance to dream phenom-
enology becomes unmistakable.
An ownership account of dream-source mis-
attribution has a number of salutary features.
First, rather than ground explanation in appeal
to the disruption of mechanisms that bear a
tenuous relation to the phenomenon under in-
vestigation, an ownership account situates ex-
planation within a theoretical space specifically
tasked with finding answers to questions per-
taining to the experienced origins of content in
consciousness.
Second, an ownership account sees content
misattribution as the result of a shift from one
naturally occurring process (personal owner-
ship) to another (perspectival ownership). There
is no need to postulate empirically unsubstanti-
ated entities (e.g., protoconsciousness;7 mental
activeness) buffeted about by theoretically un-
motivated pathologies (e.g., degradation in
evaluative competence as a function of REM-
6 It is important to note that the sole episodic memory
(i.e., “I dreamt about the argument. It was exactly the same
as the real argument. I woke up not knowing if it was real;”
Malinowski & Horton, 2014, p. 445) was not autonoetic
with respect to events that previously had taken place within
the dream narrative: It was a dream reliving of an event that
took place during waking life. Accordingly, the number of
reported experiences of mental time travel occurring exclu-
sively within the dream narrative was 0 out of 189.
7 Protoconsciousness (e.g., Hobson, 2009) is stipulated to
be a primordial form of consciousness present prenatally
and in infancy. Hobson has further assumed that protocon-
sciousness plays a foundational role in the emergence of the
more fully-developed consciousness associated with later
childhood and adulthood. With respect to dreaming, Hobson
suggested that protoconsciousness is present throughout life
and active particularly during REM-sleep dreaming. Unfor-
tunately, protoconsciousness is a hypothesis awaiting em-
pirical and conceptual evaluation. Empirically, assessment
is, at best, challenging (e.g., Morin, 2006). Conceptually,
serious scrutiny of the features ascribed to this embryonic
consciousness has yet to be undertaken. As examples, what
is the nature of the phenomenology associated with proto-
conscious? Are protoconscious experiences, in virtue of
their primordial nature, less rich (less vibrant, less articulate,
less explicit, etc.) than those associated with mature con-
sciousness? Why does protoconsciousness remain present
throughout the lifespan, especially during dreaming? These,
and a host of questions concerning protoconsciousness,
make clear that endowing the construct with causal poten-
cies is premature.
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sleep dreaming; regression to a more primitive
form of consciousness).
Finally, an ownership account promotes pre-
dictive fecundity by situating explanation
within a nomological network. In so doing, it
brings to light empirical generalizations whose
presence might otherwise have gone unnoticed
(e.g., the severely limited role of mental time
travel within the dream narrative).
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